Recent Developments in Learning and Competition with Finite Automata (Extended Abstract) -- Dynamic Mechanism Design -- Unconditional Competitive Auctions with Copy and Budget Constraints -- Truthful Auctions with Optimal Profit -- Mechanisms with Verification for Any Finite Domain -- Pure Nash Equilibria in Player-Specific and Weighted Congestion Games -- On the Complexity of Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibria in Congestion and Local-Effect Games -- Strong and Correlated Strong Equilibria in Monotone Congestion Games -- The Equilibrium Existence Problem in Finite Network Congestion Games -- First-Passage Percolation on a Width-2 Strip and the Path Cost in a VCG Auction -- Optimal Cost-Sharing Mechanisms for Steiner Forest Problems -- Mechanisms to Induce Random Choice -- Bayesian Optimal No-Deficit Mechanism Design -- Succinct Approximation of Trade-Off Curves -- Game-Theoretic Aspects of Designing Hyperlink Structures -- Competing for Customers in a Social Network: The Quasi-linear Case -- Selfish Service Installation in Networks -- Games of Connectivity -- Assignment Problems in Rental Markets -- On Portfolio's Default-Risk-Adjusted Duration and Value: Model and Algorithm Based on Copulas -- Price Roll-Backs and Path Auctions: An Approximation Scheme for Computing the Market Equilibrium -- New Results on Rationality and Strongly Polynomial Time Solvability in Eisenberg-Gale Markets -- Making Economic Theory Operational -- Sparse Games Are Hard -- Market Equilibria with Hybrid Linear-Leontief Utilities -- Polynomial Algorithms for Approximating Nash Equilibria of Bimatrix Games -- A Note on Approximate Nash Equilibria -- Ranking Sports Teams and the Inverse Equal Paths Problem -- Price of Anarchy for Polynomial Wardrop Games -- Wardrop Equilibria and Price of Stability for Bottleneck Games withSplittable Traffic -- A Worm Propagation Model Based on People's Email Acquaintance Profiles -- Mixed Strategies in Combinatorial Agency -- The Sound of Silence: Mining Implicit Feedbacks to Compute Reputation -- Strongly Polynomial-Time Truthful Mechanisms in One Shot -- Secretary Problems with Competing Employers.